Patenting government funded innovations as a strategy to increase budget for academic vaccine R&D by Songane, Mario
WORKING
PAPERS
SES
N. 509
X.2019
Faculté des sciences économiques et sociales
Wirtschafts- und sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät
Patenting Government 
Funded Innovations as a 
Strategy to Increase Budget 
for Academic Vaccine R&D  
Mario Songane
1 
 
Patenting Government Funded Innovations as a Strategy to 
Increase Budget for Academic Vaccine R&D 
 
Mario Songane* 
* Department of Economics, University of Fribourg, Boulevard de Pérolles 90, 1700, Fribourg, 
Switzerland; Email: mario.songane.09@alumni.ucl.ac.uk 
 
 
Abstract 
Vaccine development is a lengthy, expensive and risky venture, with the research and 
development (R&D) process costing billions of dollars. The pre-clinical stage of vaccine R&D 
is largely performed by academic research institutions, then continued by the pharmaceutical 
industry though licensing agreements, taking the most promising candidates to the clinical 
testing stage. Governments play a major role in de-risking the early stages of vaccine R&D for 
the pharmaceutical industry through the funding of research in public institutes and academic 
research laboratories, and providing loans and tax credit to pharmaceutical companies involved 
in vaccine R&D. Through these initiatives, governments fuel the industry, shape markets and 
aid the development of novel products and technologies. Many of the blockbuster vaccines 
currently on the market benefited greatly from government funding, however, pharmaceutical 
companies are reaping most of the rewards of the billions of dollars these vaccines generate 
every year. The present review will discuss the role that government funding and academic 
research has played in vaccines R&D. Furthermore, it will discuss some of the elaborate 
schemes pharmaceutical companies use to reduce their tax payments, and how strategies such 
as patenting government-funded innovations can help ensure that governments receive a share 
of the generated revenues. 
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1. Introduction 
The increase in antimicrobial resistance (AMR) and the threat of global epidemics have made 
the development of new vaccines an indispensable weapon to fight infectious diseases. One of 
the main causes of AMR is the widespread use of antibiotics. Vaccines generally target various 
strains of a pathogen, thus narrowing the spectrum of antibiotics required to treat diseases, and 
this effect can be enhanced through herd immunity (Lipsitch and Siber, 2016). However, the 
extensive use of antibiotics disturbs the gut flora, which increases the risk of opportunistic 
infections such as Clostridium difficile. Hence, by reducing the use of antibiotics, vaccines have 
the potential to prevent diseases caused by pathogens they would otherwise not cover (Kwok 
et al., 2012; Theriot et al., 2014; Lipsitch and Siber, 2016). 
Vaccine development is a complex and expensive endeavour surrounded by many uncertainties. 
It is estimated that it costs around US$500 million to develop simpler vaccines, and more than 
a US$1 billion to develop more complex products such as the pneumococcal vaccine Prevnar 
(Plotkin, Mahmoud and Farrar, 2015). Despite the heavy investment and involvement of highly 
qualified personnel, only 7% of vaccine candidates that enter the preclinical testing stage 
actually reach the market (Pronker et al., 2013). This high rate of failure is due to a multitude 
of factors, including the increasing difficulty in identifying vaccine targets for more complex 
diseases, tighter laws and regulations on animal and human testing, the complex patent 
landscape and competition (Kola and Landis, 2004; DiMasi and Grabowski, 2007). All of these 
challenges mean that it now takes a minimum of 10 years for a vaccine candidate to go from 
conception to the market (Oyston and Robinson, 2012). 
This high degree of uncertainty over the success of the vaccine research and development 
(R&D) process means financing institutions have to be willing to take on a high level of risk, 
endure the long R&D process and delayed profits. Vaccine R&D is financed by a wide range 
of NGOs, and private and public institutions. Due to the high degree of uncertainty, there has 
been a steady decrease in the amount of venture capital invested in the early stages of R&D 
(Fleming, 2015). Nowadays, venture capital usually focuses on investment exit strategies of 3 
years, which is quite short considering that drug and vaccine development takes at least 10 years 
(Mazzucato, 2015a). 
Pharmaceutical companies themselves finance vaccine R&D, but in many cases they invest in 
promising candidates that are close to clinical stage testing, and which were developed by 
academic research laboratories and other institutions funded by governments, charities and 
funding bodies (e.g. the Gates Foundation, the Wellcome Trust and the European Union). In 
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addition to funding R&D in public institutes and academic research laboratories, the 
government also contributes to R&D finance through loans and tax credits, thus supplying the 
early-stage high-risk finance to the pharmaceutical industry (Mazzucato and Semieniuk, 2017). 
To further help the pharmaceutical industry, the United States of America (USA) passed the 
Orphan Drug Act in 1983, which offered companies conducting research into rare diseases 
generous tax credits and market exclusivity for 7 years following their products’ approval by 
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), even if it is not patented (Lazonick and Tulum, 
2011). 
One of the major achievements in biomedical research was the sequencing of the human 
genome, achieved under the Human Genome Project. The project was founded in 1990 by the 
National Human Genome Research Institute (NHGRI, formerly known as US National Center 
for Human Genome Research), which later partnered with institutions in the US and around the 
world (Green, Watson and Collins, 2015). The sequencing of the human genome has helped 
scientists understand better the role of genetic factors in the pathogenesis of diseases such as 
cancer, Alzheimer's and schizophrenia. In addition to gaining a better understanding of 
diseases’ pathogenesis, the knowledge gained from the human genome can be used in the 
development of drugs and vaccines, public health, clinical genetics and personalised medicine 
(Wilson and Nicholls, 2015). 
The sequencing of the human genome was a major breakthrough and cost over US$3 billion, 
which mainly came from governments and various funding bodies (e.g., the Wellcome Trust) 
(Hayden, 2014). Since the sequence of the first human genome, the cost of sequencing the 
human genome has fallen from US$10 million to a couple of thousand dollars. The NHGRI has 
been the main funder of the R&D of sequencing technologies, awarding grants to 97 groups of 
academic and industrial scientists between 2004-2014 (Hayden, 2014). In addition, the NHGRI 
also aided the launch of companies and laboratories, thus helping to create an entire new 
genome sequencing industry. Illumina (San Diego, USA), the market leader in sequencing 
technology, has benefited greatly from NHGRI efforts and today employs many professionals, 
and has acquired companies that were once funded by the NHGRI (Hayden, 2014). 
In 1980 the Bayh-Dole Act gave universities and hospitals property rights over knowledge, 
technology and products developed through federal funds. However, this act allows privately-
owned companies, through patent purchases or paid licenses (including exclusive licenses), to 
gain ownership of government-funded research (Mowery et al., 2001). The aim of the Bayh-
Dole Act was to promote the growth of firms and the development of new products, since it 
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was feared that research would remain unexplored if intellectual property could not be 
transferred to private companies (Mowery et al., 2004). 
Most of the funds that governments invest on vaccine R&D come from the tax payers, and very 
little comes from the sales of the products that reach the market through the pharmaceutical 
industry, even though their early stage was government funded. In the current article, I propose 
a scheme involving the patenting and copyrighting of government-funded innovations as a 
strategy to raise capital to further fund vaccine R&D. Section 2 of this article will describe the 
crucial role governments play in funding vaccine R&D, section 3 will present evidence that 
government-funded academic research was vital for the development of some of the most 
lucrative vaccines in the market today, and sections 4 and 5 will discuss strategies governments 
could implement to gain a share of the revenues generated by the sales of vaccines whose 
preliminary development was government funded. 
 
2. Vaccine R&D and public funding  
Governments finance vaccine R&D through various forms of tax credit or grants to universities, 
institutes and the pharmaceutical industry. 
2.1. R&D tax credits 
R&D tax credits allow companies to reduce their tax bill or claim payable cash credits as a 
proportion of their R&D expenditure. This type of credit is designed to incentivise private 
companies to invest more on R&D, particularly in areas with high public importance such as 
vaccine development. By reducing the tax bill on expenditures on R&D, companies can make 
a higher return on investment on products that reach the market. Thus, tax credits contribute to 
de-risking R&D investments, and through these savings it has been estimated that the net costs 
of R&D are reduced by 50% (Tax Policy Center, 2002; Rao, 2011). 
In 2005, US pharmaceutical companies claimed over US$6 billion in tax credits, and one fifth 
of the companies in the country applied for R&D tax credits (Rao, 2011). In the USA, 
companies are entitled to up to 20% credit on research and experimentation (R&E) expenditures 
(Table 1). In the United Kingdom (UK), under the Vaccine Research Relief Programme, 
companies developing vaccines can claim up to 40% tax credit (Rao, 2011). According to 
Young and Surrusco (2001), the effective tax rate for the pharmaceutical industry is 
approximately 40% less than the average tax rate charged to other industries (Young and 
Surrusco, 2001). There are four types of tax credit: foreign, possessions, R&E and orphan drug 
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(Table 1) (Young and Surrusco, 2001). Through these tax credits, it is estimated that 
pharmaceutical companies save between US$4-10 billion per year in taxes (Young and 
Surrusco, 2001). 
  Country Purpose Year  introduced 
Orphan Drug Tax Credit USA Provides 50% tax credit for clinical testing for rare and neglected diseases. 1983 
Qualifying Therapeutic 
Discovery Research 
Project Tax Credit 
USA 
Aims to provide up to 50% tax credit to support research for unmet medical needs, 
the reduction of long-term healthcare costs and the development of new cancer 
treatments. It is targeted at companies with a maximum of 250 employees. 
2010 
R&E Credit USA 
It is divided into two types: 
Regular credit: a company may claim as a credit 20% of any qualified research 
expenses. 
Alternative Simplified Credit: Firms can claim a credit equal to 14% of the amount 
of their qualified research expenses, including contracting projects to 
biotechnology companies 
1981 
Vaccine Research Relief 
Programme UK 
Aims to promote vaccine R&D by allowing up to 40% credit on R&D expenses, 
including work subcontracted to other firms in the country and internationally. 2003 
Source: (Rao, 2011) 
Table 1. Tax credit strategies in the USA and the UK. 
 
2.2.Direct investment in vaccine R&D 
Government funding of academic research plays a crucial role in the early stages of vaccine 
development, thus fuelling the industry, shaping the market, and encouraging the development 
of new technologies. This section will discuss the role of the two of the biggest sources of 
government funding for vaccine R&D: the US National Institute of Health (NIH) and the 
European Union (EU).  
2.2.1. NIH 
The NIH is the biggest funder of biomedical research in the world and is one of the main 
organizations responsible for the biotechnology and pharmaceutical revolution. The NIH has 
invested over US$900 billion (in 2015 dollars) between 1936-2015, and since 2004 has spent 
on average over US$30 billion per year (Mazzucato, 2015b). Between 2000 and 2013, the NIH 
invested over US$400 billion (in 2013 dollars) in biotechnology and pharmaceutical knowledge 
base (Mazzucato, 2017). In comparison, venture capital in the USA only spent US$27.6 billion 
in the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries between 2001-2006 (Lazonick and Tulum, 
2011). As a result of all of this investment, approximately 75% of “new molecular entities” (the 
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most innovative medicine candidates) were funded in total or partially by the NIH (Mazzucato, 
2015b). 
Approximately 10% of the NIH budget is spent on personnel working in its 26 research centres 
and institutes, and 80% is for research grants awarded to over 325,000 researchers spread across 
3000 academic research institutes and medical schools in the USA and around the world 
(Lazonick and Tulum, 2011). Between 2008 and 2019, the NIH invested US$28.5 billion in 
vaccine R&D projects (Table 2) (NIH, 2019) thus helping to expand the industry. 
 Funding for research (in millions of US$) 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
HPV and/or Cervical 
Cancer Vaccines 19 25 25 24 26 25 38 31 38 59 82 84 
Malaria Vaccine 32 34 41 39 40 34 36 44 47 61 64 58 
Tuberculosis Vaccine 18 15 13 17 21 26 31 23 27 29 31 28 
Vaccine Related 1632 1593 1737 1717 1691 1608 1573 1585 1773 1823 2016 1845 
Vaccine Related 
(AIDS) 556 561 535 550 557 518 533 541 605 562 565 545 
Total/year 2,257 2,228 2,351 2,347 2,335 2,211 2,211 2,224 2,490 2,534 2,758 2,560 
Total from 
2008-2019 28,506 
Following a Congress request, the NIH begun to make its expenditure publicly accessible from 2008. 
Source: (NIH, 2019) 
Table 2. Annual estimates of NIH funding of vaccine R&D projects between 2008-2019. 
 
2.2.2. European union vaccine funding 
The EU is one of the main funders of basic vaccine research and under its flagship initiative, 
Horizon 2020, has been at the forefront of the field. Horizon 2020 is the largest funder of 
research and innovation in Europe, with a total budget of €97.6 billion (European Commission, 
2018a). Horizon 2020 aims to drive European economic growth and well-being by actively 
investing in all stages of the R&D process, from basic research to the market. The Horizon 2020 
vision is divided into three pillars (European Commission, 2018a): 
• The open science pillar – provision of competitive fellowships and funding research 
projects through the European Research Council and the Marie-Skłodowska-Curie 
actions. 
• The global challenges pillar – the support of research into various societal challenges, 
including the development of new therapies for cancer, clean energy, and plastic-free 
oceans. 
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• The open innovation pillar – this aims to place Europe as the leading market-creating 
region for innovation. 
Horizon 2020, through agreements between the European Commission and NIH, also funds 
research projects in the USA (Zerhouni and Potocnik, 2008). The initiative provides a wide 
range of funding schemes for vaccine research around the world, for both the academic and 
private sectors (Gancberg et al., 2015). For instance, following the 2014/15 Ebola outbreak, 
Horizon 2020 disbursed €24.4 million to fund a trial for an Ebola vaccine developed by 
pharmaceutical giant GlaxoSmithKline plc (GSK) and 2 projects to assess the passive 
administration of antibodies (Gancberg et al., 2015). 
Furthermore, under the Framework Program 6 and 7 (FP6 and FP7), the EU spent over €500 
million on vaccine projects between 2007-2016 covering the various aspects of vaccine 
development (adjuvants, vectors, antigens, delivery systems, animal models, and clinical trials) 
(Draghia-Akli, 2017). One of the most prominent projects under FP7 is the Advanced 
Immunization Technologies (ADITEC) program, a multinational collaborative project 
involving 43 partners (28 academic, 13 small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and 2 
pharmaceutical companies) from 13 different nations. Under ADITEC, 9 clinical trials were 
undertaken and over 110 peer-reviewed articles were published (Gancberg et al., 2015). 
Another initiative funded by the EU is the European and Developing Countries Clinical Trials 
Partnership (EDCTP). In the EDCTP1 (2003-2013), the EU disbursed €64 million to fund 26 
vaccine research projects and has committed to contributing a further €683 million for EDCTP2 
(2014-2023). European Member States have committed to cover the remaining funds to reach 
the required €1.4 billion budget (Gancberg et al., 2015). 
The EU is also part of the Innovative Medicines Initiative (IMI), created in 2009 in partnership 
with the European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (EFPIA) 
(Gancberg et al., 2015; Draghia-Akli, 2017). The aim of this initiative is to support research 
and innovation (novel vaccines, medicines and treatments) to achieve both public health 
benefits and commercial success (Draghia-Akli, 2017). The total budget for 2014-2024 is €3.27 
billion (€1.64 billion from the EU) and €215 million have already been committed in the form 
of grants for projects researching the Ebola vaccine (Gancberg et al., 2015; Draghia-Akli, 
2017). The IMI funding is destined to small and medium-sized pharmaceutical companies, 
academic research institutions, patient organisations and regulatory agencies (Draghia-Akli, 
2017). 
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In addition to the programmes mentioned above, the EU is also involved in funding vaccine 
research through a range of partnerships and initiatives: 
• Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI) 
The CEPI was launched following the 2013-16 Ebola outbreak with the objective of supporting 
the development of vaccine candidates for a range of neglected infectious diseases (Wellcome 
Trust, 2019). The CEPI has received approximately US$740 million (target is US$1 billion) 
from the EU, the Gates Foundation, the Wellcome Trust and several governments (Japan, 
Germany, Norway and Canada). The EU contributed in kind with €250 million (Wellcome 
Trust, 2019). 
• InnovFin Infectious Diseases (InnovFin ID) 
The InnovFin ID, an EU initiative, funds research into drugs and vaccines at their early stages 
of clinical development, medical devices, and infrastructure (European Commission, 2018b). 
The initiative mainly provides loans and grants valued between €7.5-75 million to 
pharmaceutical companies, research institutions and legal bodies. Through this initiative, the 
EU aims to share the risks involved in developing novel products with the pharmaceutical and 
biotechnology industries, thus promoting growth, de-risking R&D investment into infectious 
diseases, and reducing the risk of global epidemics (European Commission, 2018b). 
• Fast Track to Innovation (FTI) 
With this initiative, the EU aims to accelerate the development, market entry and take-up of 
novel innovations. FTI is committed to disbursing €100 million per year between 2015-2020 
(Schmaltz, 2015). The initiative sets out to help private and public partners to collaborate to 
create and test novel revolutionary products and services (Schmaltz, 2015; European 
Commission, 2019). 
 
3. The role of government-funded academic research in the R&D of 
vaccines currently on the market 
3.1.Human papilloma virus (HPV) vaccines: Gardasil and Cervarix 
HPV is a group that encompasses over 100 virus, where 15 of them have been shown to be 
responsible for almost all cases of cervical cancer (Clifford et al., 2005). Globally, around 630 
million people are infected with HPV and half of women in the world will have an infection 
caused by this virus in their lifetime (Merck, 2008). On average, there are 530,000 new cases 
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of cervical cancer and approximately 266,000 deaths per year, with the highest incidence in 
developing nations where HPV vaccine coverage is low (UNICEF, 2018). 
Fifteen HPV types have been shown to have oncogenic potential: HPV 16, 18, 31, 33, 35, 39, 
45, 51, 52, 56, 58, 59, 68, 73, and 82. One of the challenges to create a vaccine and treatment 
for HPV is the fact that an individual can be infected by more than one HPV type (Choi et al., 
2012). Globally, HPV 16 and 18 are responsible for approximately 70% of all cases of cervical 
cancer. HPV type 16 causes mainly squamous cell carcinoma, whereas HPV 18 causes the less 
aggressive adenocarcinoma (Bosch et al., 2008). 
The two most widely used prophylactic vaccines on the market are Gardasil-4 (Merck, USA) 
and Cervarix (GSK, UK), entering the market in 2006 and 2007, respectively (McKee, Bergot 
and Leggatt, 2015). Both vaccines contain virus-like particles (VLPs) for HPV 16 and 18, which 
cause cervical cancer, but Gardasil-4 also has VLPs for HPV 6 and 11, which cause benign 
genital warts (Ma, Roden and Wu, 2010). 
Academic institutes in the USA (The National Cancer Institute (NCI) and Georgetown 
University) and Australia (University of Queensland) first developed the L1-VLP technology 
employed in the VLP-based vaccines in the early 1990s (Padmanabhan et al., 2010). 
John T. Schiller and Douglas R. Lowy from NCI (part of the NIH) produced non-infectious 
HPV VLPs capable of inducing the production of protective antibodies that could neutralize a 
HPV infection (Roden et al., 1996; Pastrana et al., 2001; NIH, 2017). Jian Zhou and Ian H. 
Frazer from the Papillomavirus Research Unit (University of Queensland) developed a method 
to express HPV L1 and L2 capsid proteins that self-assembled into VLPs. Furthermore, they 
also found that the minor HPV capsid protein L2 is essential for virus life cycle (Zhou et al., 
1991, 1994, 1999). The research by Schiller and Lowy was funded by the NCI (hence the NIH), 
while the research conducted by Zhou and Frazer was funded by the NIH, National Health and 
Medical Research Council, the Queensland Cancer Fund, the Mayne Bequest, and the Princess 
Alexandra Hospital Research and Development Foundation. 
The NCI licensed the technology to Merk and MedImmune (which also paid for an exclusive 
license of the intellectual property (IP) belonging to Georgetown University). Merck later also 
paid for an exclusive license for the VLP related IP belonging to the University of Queensland 
(Padmanabhan et al., 2010). GSK then bought the entire MedImmune IP portfolio in 1998, 
meaning that Merck and GSK held all the VLP IP available at the time. Due to a significant 
uncertainty over patent infringement because of the large scope of some of the patents, GSK 
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and Merck signed a cross-license agreement that allowed the companies to use each other`s 
technologies related to HPV vaccine development (Padmanabhan et al., 2010). 
Merck and GSK then improved on the original government-funded research that was carried 
out in academic institutions and performed the subsequent steps required to bring the vaccine 
to the market (Padmanabhan et al., 2010). Merck`s Gardasil-4, the first VLP-based vaccine, 
was patented in the USA in 1998 and introduced to the market in 2006 (Castro et al., 2017). 
Between the first patent approval and 2010, 81 HPV vaccine-related patents were granted in 
the USA, with Merck leading the way with 24 patents (Padmanabhan et al., 2010). GSK 
released their VLP-based vaccine in 2007. 
Both vaccines target HPV L1 major capsid protein which assembles to form VLPs with a 
morphology similar to the HPV native virions, and generates robust antibody responses against 
the targeted HPV types (Ma, Roden and Wu, 2010). Merck introduced a new HPV vaccine, 
Gardasil-9, in the USA and Europe in 2014 and 2015 respectively. In addition to the four HPV 
types covered in Gardasil-4, the new vaccine also provides protection against HPV types 31, 
33, 45, 52 and 58 (Merck, 2018). Table 3 shows the global revenues of Gardasil and Cervarix 
between 2006 and 2017.  
 Revenue in (in millions of US$) 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015* 2016* 2017* 2018* Total 
Gardasil 
*  242,30 1,956.6 2,268.1 1,667.6 1,338.0 1,462.0 1,895.0 2,122.0 1,986.0 2,092.0 2,389.0 2,308.0 3,151 24,877.6 
Cervarix 
**  - 20.1 248.75 306.68 367.84 814.66 423.9 261.44 202.96 137.28 106.92 172.86 180.78 3,244.17 
* Includes sales of Gardasil-4 and Gardasil-9. Sources (Merck, 2008, 2009, 2012, 2015, 2017, 2018, 2019). ** Sources 
(GSK, 2008, 2011, 2014a, 2017a, 2018, 2019). Original revenues are in Great Britain Pound (£). Used the exchange rate 
of the respective year on July 2 (MacroTrends, 2019) to calculate the revenue in US$. 
Table 3. Revenue of Gardasil and Cervarix from 2006-2018. 
 
3.2.Pneumococcal conjugate vaccines 
Pneumococcal disease is a bacterial infection by Streptococcus pneumonia that causes 
inflammation in the lungs, bacteremia (bacteria in the blood stream), meningitis (infection of 
the tissue surrounding the brain and spinal cord), pneumonia and infection of the middle ear 
(Bencker, 2013). The disease can affect all age groups, but young children, the elderly and 
individuals with particular chronic medical conditions are significantly more susceptible. 
Pneumococcal disease is by far the biggest cause of child death globally, the vast majority in 
the developing world, and it is estimated that it causes around 800,000 deaths in children 
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younger than 5 years of age annually (Bencker, 2013). According to the World Health 
Organization (WHO), pneumonia alone is responsible for 23% of deaths of children under 5 
years of age globally (WHO, 2016). 
The major challenge for developing a polysaccharide vaccine was the fact that children under 
2 years of age respond poorly and do not develop an immunologic memory (Brueggemann et 
al., 2007). This challenge was overcome by Oswald T. Avery and Walther F. Goebel of the 
Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research hospital, who covalently linked polysaccharides 
with immunogenic proteins, thus enabling the vaccine candidate to induce the recruitment of 
CD4+ T cells while establishing immunologic memory and high IgG titer (Avery and Goebel, 
1931). The two scientists thus gave rise to the conjugation technology that was further 
developed by other academic research groups (Paul, Katz and Benacerraf, 1971; Lindberg et 
al., 1974; Boquet and Pappenheimer, 1976; Talwar et al., 1976) and later employed in various 
conjugated vaccines, including the Haemophilus influenzae type b (Hib) diphtheria CRM197 
conjugate vaccine (Bixler et al., 1989). 
Prevnar 7, the first pneumococcal conjugate vaccine (approved in 2000), is composed of 7 
saccharides derived from the capsular antigens of the Streptococcus pneumoniae serotypes 
covered in the vaccine individually conjugated to the immunologic carrier protein (the 
diphtheria CRM197 protein) (Gruber, Scott and Emini, 2012). Prevnar 7 was developed by 
Wyeth, which was later acquired by Pfizer (Pfizer 2011), following the principles employed to 
develop the Haemophilus influenzae type b (Hib) CRM197 conjugate vaccine (Poolman, 
Peeters and van den Dobbelsteen, 2013). 
For the Prevnar 7 vaccine, Pfizer used an aluminium-based adjuvant to allow the serotypes to 
act together and was granted a patent on the grounds of the vaccine's novelty, capability for 
industrial application and the research methodology that enabled the increased therapeutic 
efficacy (Garçon, Leroux-Roels and Cheng, 2011; Rajam and Poddar, 2018). 
Adjuvants are used in vaccines to induce an early high and long-term immune response. 
Adjuvants have been employed in vaccine development since Ramon first described in 1925 
their benefiting effects on immune response following the injection of tetanus and diphtheria 
toxoids with compounds such as agar, tapioca, lecithin and saponin (Ramon, 1925, 1926). The 
technology for using aluminium-based adjuvants in vaccines has been extensively studied and 
developed by various academic research groups since the mid-20th century (Aprile and 
Wardlaw, 1966; Jensen and Koch, 1988; Bomford, 1989; Gupta and Siber, 1994; Gupta et al., 
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1995). Thus, the technology employed to create the pneumococcal conjugate vaccines was 
largely developed by academic research institutions with government funding. 
Prevnar 7 was the first vaccine in the world to generate over US$1000 million in net revenue 
(Wyeth, 2006). In 2010, Pfizer and GSK released two new pneumococcal conjugate vaccines, 
the Prevnar 13 (Pfizer) and PCV10 or Synflorix (GSK) (GSK, 2011; Pfizer, 2012). Globally, 
the Prevnar vaccines have brought in revue of US$56,950.70 million, whereas Synflorix sales 
have brought in £ 3,577.00 million (Table 4). 
Prevnar 7 (revenue in millions of US$) 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Revenue per year  461 798.2 647.5 945.6 1,053.6 1,508.3 1,961.3 2,439.1 2,715.5 287 1253 488 399 
Total revenue 14,956.7 
Sources: (Wyeth, 2003, 2006, 2009; Pfizer, 2012, 2015) 
Prevnar 13 (revenue in millions of US$) 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Total per year 2,416.00 3,657.00 4,117.00 3,974.00 4,464.00 6,245.00 5,718.00 5,601.00 5,802.00 
Total generated 41,994  
Sources: (Pfizer, 2012, 2015, 2018, 2019) 
  
PCV 10 or Synflorix (revenue in millions of US$)* 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Total/year* 335.92 563.5 604.45 615.6 684.56 594.36 665.28 656.61 555.44 
Total revenue 5,275.72 
* Original revenues are in £. Used the exchange rate of the respective year on July 2 (MacroTrends, 2019) to calculate the 
revenue in US$. Sources: (GSK, 2011, 2014b, 2018, 2019) 
Table 4. Revenue gained from the sales of pneumococcal conjugate vaccines from 2000-2017. 
 
3.3.Rotavirus vaccine: Rotateq and Rotarix 
The rotavirus is the main cause of severe diarrhoea among children under 5 years of age, killing 
between 200,000-300,000 annually. It is responsible for 111 million cases of gastroenteritis, 25 
million hospital consultations and 2 million hospitalizations per year (de Oliveira et al., 2008; 
Tate et al., 2016). The vast majority of rotavirus cases occur in low and middle-income 
countries. The introduction of two rotavirus vaccines, RotaTeq (Merck) and Rotarix (GSK), as 
part of routine immunization programmes in over 70 countries has helped reduce the number 
of deaths from 528,000 in 2000 to 215,000 in 2013 (Tate et al., 2016). 
RotaTeq provides protection against 5 strains of rotavirus (pentavalent), and was developed by 
H. Fred Clark and Stanley Plotkin of the Wistar Institute (University of Pennsylvania), and Paul 
Offit of the Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia (CHOP). 
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The scientists identified rotavirus surface proteins capable of inducing the production of 
protective antibodies, determined the strain specificity of the antibody response, and discovered 
that the vaccine had to act in the intestinal mucosa to induce the immune protection (Offit and 
Blavat, 1986; Offit, Shaw and Greenberg, 1986; Shaw et al., 1986; Offit and Dudzik, 1989; 
Offit et al., 1991, 1994; Offit, 1994; Treanor et al., 1995). The scientists also performed efficacy 
and safety clinical trials in infants in a couple of cities in the USA and Central African Republic 
(Clark et al., 1986, 1988; Treanor et al., 1995). The work was mainly funded by the NIH, but 
other institutions such as the Merieux Institute (France), WHO and the Hassel Foundation 
(USA) also contributed. 
Merck acquired the license from CHOP (fee plus royalties) and took the then vaccine candidate 
to efficacy clinical trials in 1992. Following a series of clinical trials, the vaccine was licensed 
in 2006 (Clark, 2008; Light, Andrus and Warburton, 2009). 
Rotarix, a monovalent vaccine, was developed by Richard Ward and David Bernstein at the 
Cincinnati Children’s Hospital Medical Center in the beginning of the 1990s, and was granted 
a patent in 1995 (Ward, Bernstein and Plotkin, 2009). The two scientists isolated the human 
rotavirus strain, created an orally-deliverable vaccine candidate, and performed the early 
efficacy and safety clinical trials (Ward, Bernstein and Plotkin, 2009). The research was largely 
funded by the NIH (Ward, Bernstein and Plotkin, 2009). 
 
 Revenue (in millions of US$) 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Total 
RotaTeq 
(Merck) * 163 525 665 522 519 651 601 636 659 610 652 686 728 7,617 
Rotarix 
(GSK) ** 
81.40 182.91 332.33 462.48 357.20 483.00 565.20 570.00 646.72 650.52 619.08 675.96 682.51 6,309.31 
Sources: *(Merck, 2008, 2009, 2012, 2015, 2018, 2019) **(GSK, 2008, 2011, 2014a, 2017b, 2018, 2019). Original revenues 
are in £. Used the exchange rate of the respective year on July 2 (MacroTrends, 2019) to calculate the revenue in US$. 
Table 5. Rotavirus vaccines revenue between 2006-2017 
 
The patent was then licensed to the Virus Research Institute which later merged with T Cell 
Sciences to give rise to a new company named Avant Immunotherapeutics (Drugs R&D, 2004). 
Avant Immunotherapeutics then undertook further phase II clinical trials, which showed that 
the vaccine provided 89% protection and resulted in few adverse events. In 1997, GSK acquired 
the global marketing rights of the vaccine candidate, assumed all development costs and paid 
Avant US$5.5 million in milestone payments plus a royalty of 10% on net sales (Drugs R&D, 
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2004; Light, Andrus and Warburton, 2009). GSK then took the vaccine candidate to phase III 
clinical trials and the vaccine was licensed in 2006 (Light, Andrus and Warburton, 2009). 
From 2006 to 2017, RotaTeq resulted in sales of US$6,889 million, whereas Rotarix saw sales 
of £3,640 million (Table 5). 
 
4. How governments can take a share of the vaccine sales revenue 
The vaccines described above have generated over US$100 billion in sales revenue. Based on 
the information presented in this article, it is clear that the governments that funded the early 
stage of the R&D of these vaccines should receive a percentage of the revenues generated. The 
current belief is that governments get some of the money back through taxes paid by the 
companies themselves and their employees. However, in addition to tax breaks, companies have 
elaborate strategies to reduce the amount of tax that they pay. 
One of the most common strategies pharmaceutical companies use is tax inversion, which 
consists of relocating a corporation's legal domicile to countries or states with low-tax or no-
tax jurisdictions (i.e., Republic of Ireland) while maintaining its revenue generating operations 
in the country of origin which has high taxes (i.e., USA) (Sikka and Willmott, 2010; Houlder, 
Boland and Politi, 2014). 
In the mid-20th century, the Republic of Ireland began to adopt low-tax policies to attract major 
corporations to the country and now has a 12.5% corporate tax, much lower than the 35% 
corporate tax in the USA (Houlder, Boland and Politi, 2014). Nine of the ten biggest 
pharmaceutical companies in the world have corporate headquarters in the Republic of Ireland 
(Houlder, Boland and Politi, 2014). In the Republic of Ireland, the pre-tax profits to wages ratio 
is between 30-40% for Irish companies, but for foreign companies this ratio can be as high as 
800% (Tørsløv, Wier and Zucman, 2018). On the other hand, in the USA the pre-tax profits to 
wages ratio is between 30-40% for both local and foreign companies (Tørsløv, Wier and 
Zucman, 2018). These figures clearly show that big global corporations are shifting their 
revenues to countries such as the Republic of Ireland in order to pay less corporate tax. 
One of the most recent cases of tax inversion was Endo International, a generics and specialty 
branded pharmaceutical company, which moved its corporate headquarters to the Republic of 
Ireland in 2013. The company generates almost all of it revenue in the USA, with only US$230 
million of the US$3.47 billion generated in 2017 coming from outside the USA, but the vast 
majority of its corporate tax is paid in the Republic of Ireland (Houlder, Boland and Politi, 
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2014; Endo, 2018). In addition, Endo International will save around US$75 million per year 
through “operational and tax synergies” (Houlder, Boland and Politi, 2014). Furthermore, tax 
inversion also allows companies to offshore IP, thus avoiding tax on it (Houlder, Boland and 
Politi, 2014).  
The USA pharmaceutical industry only paid 6% on more than US$100 billion in profits 
registered in the Republic of Ireland between 2004-2014 (Houlder, Boland and Politi, 2014). A 
recent report by OXFAM estimated that Pfizer, Johnson & Johnson, Abbott and Merck avoided 
US$4.8 billion in taxes between 2013 and 2015 in nine developed economies  (Germany, New 
Zealand, Spain, France, Australia, Italy, Denmark, the United Kingdom and the USA) 
(OXFAM, 2018). Approximately US$2.3 billion in taxes was avoided in the USA alone during 
that period (OXFAM, 2018). While such elaborate strategies to reduce tax payments are not 
illegal, they nonetheless hurt both the economies of those countries (OXFAM, 2018). 
The overall corporate tax in the USA is 35%, but for the pharmaceutical industry the average 
effective corporate tax between 2008-2015 was 27.7% (ITEP, 2017). If profits generated abroad 
were to be repatriated to the USA, the company would have to pay the 35% tax rate minus the 
tax rate paid in the country in which the profit was generated (ITEP, 2017). This is one of the 
reasons companies keep their profits in tax heavens such as the Republic of Ireland, Bermuda, 
the Cayman Islands and the Bahamas (ITEP, 2017). Illustrative of the creative profit shifting 
strategy is the fact that USA companies based in Bermuda and the Cayman Islands reported 
collective profits that were over 15 times higher than the GDP of these two countries (ITEP, 
2017). 
 
 
Amount of unrepatriated foreign income in millions of 
US$ 
Company 2016 2015 2014 Total 
Pfizer 197,096 193,589 175,798 566,483 
Merck 63,100 59,200 60,000 182,300 
Total 748,783 
Source: (ITEP, 2017) 
Table 6. Amount of unrepatriated foreign income held by Pfizer and Merck between 2014-
2016. 
 
According to the Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy (ITEP), collectively the Fortune 
500 corporations avoided paying around US$767 billion in USA federal income taxes through 
the keeping of over $2.6 trillion of “permanently reinvested” profits offshore (ITEP, 2017). For 
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instance, between 2014–2016, Merck and Pfizer collectively held almost US$750 billion in 
unrepatriated foreign income (Table 6). 
In addition, corporations often use their own stocks to pay their executives and other employees 
as compensation or bonuses. Through this strategy, corporations can claim “excess stock-option 
tax benefits” and between 2008-2015 it was estimated that USA corporations collectively saved 
$51.6 billion in taxes (Gardner, Mcintyre and Phillips, 2017) 
Other strategies to lower a company’s tax bill include complex pricing schemes. GSK was 
accused of avoiding approximately US$ 5.2 billion worth of taxes in the USA by undercharging 
marketing services supplied by its subsidiary in the country from 1989 to 1996, and agreed to 
settle the case in 2006 for US$3.4 billion (Sikka and Willmott, 2010). Furthermore, companies 
often shift manufacturing to other countries where the labour costs are lower, meaning that a 
significant number of jobs and taxes are lost (Mazzucato, 2015a). 
Governments invest a significant amount of money and resources into the development of 
vaccines and other medical products, thus playing a crucial role in de-risking the R&D process 
for the pharmaceutical industry. Below, we present four possible ways through which a 
government can recoup its investment in R&D: 
• A government should sign agreements with companies to ensure that the loans it 
provides have to be repaid once the product/company start generating profits above a 
certain threshold (Mazzucato, 2015a). 
• Retain equity in the companies that receive tax credits and loans. For instance, Sitra, the 
Finnish National Fund for R&D that reports to the parliament, provided capital for 
Nokia during the company’s early stages and retained equity in return (Hira and Hira, 
2012). Through such a scheme, the government of Finland ensured that it would recoup 
its investment and make a profit in case the company became successful. 
• Patent and copyright – another strategy would be for the government to hold intellectual 
property and rent the license in order to guarantee a share of the revenue generated from 
the products that benefited from government-funded R&D. Through such a strategy, the 
government would guarantee a constant inflow of capital that could be used to fund new 
R&D projects and cover the losses of failed projects (Mazzucato, 2015a). The 
government could also prevent the adverse effects of market monopolies by issuing a 
general public license. 
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5. Patents as a strategy to generate revenue for governments 
The most common strategy to generate revenue from patents is through licenses, a contract 
between the patent holder and a third party who wishes to use the protected technology for 
further innovation. The third party pays the patent holder a fee upfront and/or royalties overtime 
(Palomeras, 2007). 
Patents give the holder market exclusivity. This exclusivity may encompass the product, 
regulatory exclusivity (e.g., data exclusivity), developmental technologies and product 
composition. Typically, patents are granted for 20 years, but often holders successfully apply 
for extensions of up to five years (Lakdawalla, 2018). 
The majority of the research undertaken at universities is funded by governments. It is common 
practice for universities, through invention disclosures, to retain part or full IP of the innovation 
that takes place on their premises (Sine, Shane and Gregorio, 2003). Patents, due to their ability 
to influence the market through monopolies, are the most common strategy universities use to 
retain IP, and previous studies have found that the probability of patenting by universities is 
much higher for biomedical innovations (Mowery et al., 2001). According to some estimates, 
universities hold approximately 8% of the total number of patents issued in the USA (Sine, 
Shane and Gregorio, 2003). 
In terms of biomedical research, universities perform the early stages of R&D and the later 
stages are undertaken by private companies, who pay for the license or buy the patent. Most 
universities have technology licensing personnel who, along with the innovators, identify and 
target entities in both the private and public sector who could be interested in the development 
(Sine, Shane and Gregorio, 2003). 
One of the main features that influences the profitability of a patent is its scope. The patent 
scope determines the technological space that the innovation covers. A broad patent scope 
therefore would generate more revenue due to the higher probability that a product will infringe 
the patent (Merges and Nelson, 1990). 
As mentioned earlier, patents generate revenue through up-front cash payment and/or royalties 
as a percentage of sales (Feldman et al., 2002). Sen and Taumann (2007) found that a 
combination of royalties and fees generates more revenue than royalties or license fees alone 
(Sen and Tauman, 2007). However, Rickard et al. found that higher revenues are generated 
when royalties are used alone with a nonexclusive contract (Rickard, Richards and Yan, 2016). 
If governments retain the IP of the inventions/innovations they have funded, it would allow 
18 
 
revenue to be obtained and then used to fund additional research, as well as prevent the negative 
effects of monopolies (Palomeras, 2007). 
However, to take full advantage of licensing, governments need to set up structures to market 
IP. One strategy could be to employ interdisciplinary scientists who are able to identify a variety 
of applications of a technology, publish detailed description of patents in online repositories 
which are easily accessible to interested stakeholders, and adopt a portfolio management 
approach to manage patents. Such a government-run market place would overcome transaction 
costs, without introducing the rigidities of traditional technology markets (Palomeras, 2007). 
 
6. Conclusion 
The prevailing view is that governments and academia play a small role in the development of 
new vaccines. However, this article showed that they have indeed played a crucial role in the 
R&D process of some of the most lucrative vaccines currently on the market. However, the 
pharmaceutical companies are reaping the majority of the benefits of the resulting revenue, with 
relatively little in the form of taxes going back to governments.  
A new strategy is urgently needed because governments are increasingly working on tighter 
budgets, leading to circumstances such as the US government attempting to reduce the budget 
available for biomedical research (Pear, 2017; Salzberg, 2017). Such budget cuts would have 
negative consequences for biomedical research and by extension, public health. 
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